tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5949922529631180407.post4467714159685265506..comments2024-03-26T01:16:29.449+05:30Comments on The Demanding Mistress: Section 3(3) and 3(4) of the Competition Act, 2002: Difference in Standard of ProofJ.Sai Deepakhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08357301068067861565noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5949922529631180407.post-32219008660543412102013-11-01T22:26:48.208+05:302013-11-01T22:26:48.208+05:30JSD,I really miss your incisive posts on current ...JSD,I really miss your incisive posts on current patent issues!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5949922529631180407.post-23319732413987113492013-10-10T12:12:01.614+05:302013-10-10T12:12:01.614+05:30I entirely agree. Under 3(3), the mere fact of an...I entirely agree. Under 3(3), the mere fact of an agreement regarding 3 (3) (a) to (d), {any not all, though the word or is missing at the end of each} is sufficient for presumption of AAEC. It amounts to a per se violation and the burden of proving innocence is on the charged parties; however, under 3(4) an agreement alone is not sufficient and a test of rule of reason has to be applied, which means that the standard required for alleging infringement is of a higher order. SP Deohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10281111014534973567noreply@blogger.com